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Abstract
The Hungarian government seemingly facilitated the resettlement of 
Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia. Diplomatic opportunities – provided 
by the treaty – were used to execute the population exchange in an orderly, 
financially settled way, as far as it was possible within the framework of the 
exchange quota. The other option of minority Hungarians to stay in their 
native land was reslovatization, which was treated as the lesser of two evils 
and chosen consciously as the only means to it.
The Czechoslovakian government tried to get free  a hand from the winner 
great powers to expatriate the German and Hungarian nationals from 
Czechoslovakia. Since the cease-fire agreement with Hungary did not 
allow the realization of a process, a solution similar to the expelling of the 
Sudeten Germans was also considered1. In order to succeed in evacuating 
the greatest possible proportion of the two minorities, foreign secretary 
Vladimír Clementis handed over a memorandum to the government of 
the powers on the 3rd of July 1945, asking for permission to transfer i.e. 
for a one-sided expulsion of 2-2,5 million Germans and 400 000 Hungar-
ians. According to the Clementis memorandum, the representatives of 
the Czechoslovakian government could have consulted the Allied Control 
Commission in Budapest over the question of the transferring of the 
greater part of the Hungarians living in Slovakia as part of a population 
1 Vavro Šrobár the Czechoslovakian finance minister of Slovakian birth proposed a plan to expel 
0% of Hungarians from all the localities with Hungarian inhabitants leaving them to rely 
only on their own transport and means to move to Hungary. Vadkerty, Katalin: Maďarská 
otázka  v Èeskoslovensku 1945–1948. Dekréty prezidenta Beneša a ich dosledky na deportáciu 
a reslovakizáciu. Kalligram, Bratislava, 2002. 59–582. 
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exchange for the 345 000 Slovakians of Hungarian citizenship, who should 
repatriate to Slovakia.2 
To justify the deportation plans the Czechoslovakian secretary referred 
to the “conviction of the Czechoslovakian nation” that without the depor-
tation of the Germans and Hungarians from Czechoslovakia it would not 
be possible to ensure the normal and peaceful development of the state nor 
the permanent peace and stability in Central Europe.3 The memorandum 
presented to the great ambassadors of the great powers in Prague was a 
last effort of persuasion before the Potsdam conference. The deportation 
of the two minorities was introduced as the “most pressing problem” and 
stressed that any delay in solving it would seriously trouble every Czech 
and Slovak citizen. of the three great powers only the Soviet government 
supported the request without reservation; the Brits kept raising more 
and more objections, while the Americans were from the start out against 
the suggestion of extending collective guilt to any other people except the 
Germans. Article XII. of the Potsdam conference protocol authorized only 
the orderly and humane transfer of Germans from Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Hungary to Germany, prohibiting any further expelling of Germans 
from their native country. After the Potsdam conference the Prague 
government together with the Slovakian representative corporate could 
not but accept that they had no permission for the one-sided deportation 
of Hungarian minority.4
The road to a “pure Slav nation-state”
The Kassa government programme of 5. April 1945 set the aim at a Slav 
nation-state. In order to achieve it the Czechoslovakian authorities had to 
reach back to the treaty with Hungary about population exchange. The 
laws on the deprivation of civil rights were applied against the Hungarian 
minority communities. The edicts and national council regulations 
2 Churaň, Milan: Postupim a Èeskoslovensko. Mýtus a skuteènost. Nakaladatelství Libri, Praha, 
2001. 109–110.
3 Ibid. 110.
4 2. August, 1945, the last day of the Potsdam conference is the date of President Beneš’s edict, 
1945. no 33., on the regulation of Czechoslovakian citizenship of German and Hungarian na-
tionals. The Czechoslovakian citizenship of German and Hungarian nationals who became the 
citizens of another state in 1938-39 or later was cancelled from the date of their new citizen-
ship, and that of other German and Hungarian nationals from the date of the edict. Thus a le-
gal background has been created for the eviction and deportation of Hungarians and Germans. 
Szarka László ed.: Jogfosztó jogszabályok Csehszlovákiában 1944-1949. Elnöki dekrétumok, 
törvények, rendeletek, szerzõdések. [Laws for deprivation of civil rights in Czechoslovakia. 
Presidential decrees, laws, regulations, treatises] MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató In-
tézet – Kecskés László Társaság, Komárom, 2005. 122.   
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deprived minority Hungarians of their civic, economic, social and nation-
ality rights.5
Economic interests also motivated the measures against Hungarians 
in Slovakia. The February 1945 regulation of the Slovakian National 
Council ruling the confiscation of the land-property of Hungarians and 
Germans claiming the act as “giving back the land to Slovakia”, was actu-
ally a radical nationalization of land-property. The first really concise 
presidential edict of Edvard Beneš against the two minorities was No.5, 
issued on the 19th May 1945 which, together with regulation No. 50. 1945 
of the Slovakian National Council especially referring to the territory of 
Slovakia, ruled for the appointment of Czech and Slovak national trus-
tees respectively to oversee the land-properties, factories, buildings and 
other valuables of Hungarian owners. A week later, regulation No. 51. 
dissolved all the Hungarian associations in Southern Slovakia and confis-
cated their possessions. This was the end of Hanza co-operative, founded 
in 1925, the Béla Bartók choir in Pozsony, even the Masaryk Academy, 
which was founded by the donation of President Masaryk, the founder 
of the Czechoslovakian state, and several hundred other institutions in 
Hungarian towns, villages, settlements.6
In their consequence the presidential edicts and the additional Slova-
kian National Council regulations seriously aggravated the situation of 
the Hungarian minority. The severest was the presidential edict of the 
2nd August 1945, on the day of the signing of the Potsdam protocol, which 
deprived automatically Hungarians and Germans of their citizenship, 
with the exception of active anti-fascists. This edict became the source of 
every later deprivation of civil rights and grievances because the loss of 
citizenship by definition excluded the members of the two minorities from 
employment, compensation for nationalized property, pension and other 
state benefits. 
With the loss of their civic, minority, economic and social rights the 
Hungarians of Slovakia got into total legal and social void. The plan of 
5 Šutaj, Štefan – Mosný, Petr –olejník, Milan: Prezidentské dekrty Edvarda Beneša v povo-
jnovom Slovensku, Veda, Bratislava, 2002; Jech Karel (red.): Němci a Maďaři v dekretech 
prezidenta republiky. Studie a dokumenty 1940–1945. Die Deutschne und Magyaren in den 
Dekreten des Präsidenten der Republik. Studien und Dokumenten 1940–1945. Nakladatelství 
Doplněk, Brno, 2003; Šutaj, Štefan (ed.): Dekréty Edvarda Beneša v povojnovom obodobí, Uni-
versum, Prešov, 2004; Szarka László (szerk.): Jogfosztó jogszabályok, etc.  
6 Szarka László ed.: Jogfosztó jogszabályok… pp. 93-99, 182-188.
 Analysing the phases of the composition of the edict, the final version clearly appears to be the 
medium of deprivation of civil rights because only thos Hungarians and Germans could keep 
their citizenship who officially registered as Czechs or Slovaks during the “increased danger of 
the republic”. Szarka op.cit. pp 122-124. on the preliminaries and alternative text variants cf. 
Jech Karel (red.): Němci a Maďaři v dekretech prezidenta pp. 313–349. 
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the authorities was to fill the place of the deported Hungarians by repat-
riating Slovaks from other countries and totally disrupt the Hungarian 
communities by relocating Slovaks from the northern regions of Slovakia, 
all this being part of the battle for political power; the radical solution 
of the Hungarian question was to strengthen the position of the Slovak 
Communist Party.8
During the last phase of World War II. the Czechoslovak army, the 
Slovak resistance, later the Czechoslovakian government and the Slova-
kian National Council were considering to deport the Hungarians, similar 
to the Germans, with army assistance, or as an alternative, expelling 
them “spontaneously”.9 Immediately after the front having left the area 
the Czechoslovakian military and civil authorities were keen on creating 
an atmosphere for the Hungarians to flee to Hungary.  However, the 
Hungarian inhabitants who had lived there for several hundreds of years 
did not show any remorse when the Czechoslovakian authorities returned. 
Though the 1945 spring plan of Czechoslovakian finance minister Vavro 
Šrobár was accepted by the Slovakian National Council as its programme 
to deal with the Hungarian question, the brutal deportations suggested 
by the plan were carried out at some Hungarian villages in the neigh-
bourhood of érsekújvár: in Andód, Udvard, Tardoskedd only, during the 
months immediately after the end of the war. Most of the families dumped 
at the Hungarian border soon returned to their homes.10 
Extremist plans were also made for Pozsony and Kassa. on the 5 May 
1945 extensive anti-Hungarian measures were introduced in Pozsony with 
reference to the 1945 No. 131 State Security Law; the ultimate aim was the 
deportation of the complete German and Hungarian communities.11 The 
greater part of the members of the two communities were crowded into 
an isolated camp in Ligetfalu only accessible across a temporary pontoon 
bridge or were expelled from the country at short notice. The internment 
camp at Ligetfalu – there was another one established in the earlier lager 
for Jews at Szered – was cleared in August 1946. The Hungarians were 
8 Kaplan, Karel: Csehszlovákia igazi arca, Kalligram Kiadó Budapest–Pozsony, 1995. pp. 108–
112. [Showing the true colors of Czechoslovakia]
9 Baláž Július: Maďarská otázka v prvom povojnovom desaťroèí povojnového Èeskoslovenska 
(1945–1948) Kandidátska práca. FF Karlovy Unierzity. Katedra èeskoslovenských dějin, Pra-
ha, 1991. Kézirat, MTA KI Archívum 1/161 [Unpublished dissertation].
10 Vadkerty, Katalin: A belsõ telepítések és a lakosságcsere. Kalligramm Könyvkiadó, Pozsony 
1998. pp. 86-8.[Internal settling and population exchange].
11 Ibid. p. 88; Salner, Peter: Premeny Bratislavy 1939–1993, Veda, Bratislava 1998. 38–43. Salner 
cites the 1945 protocol decisions of the Pozsony National Committee against the Germans 
and Hungarians. Thus the proposal of  Sekáè MP about the special marking to be worn by the 
members of the two communities was acceptedon 22. June. However, the regulation had to be 
withdrawn because of local and international uproar. Ibid. p.41.
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under constant control, either doing communal work or locked in the camp. 
Similar conditions were created for the Hungarians at Kassa too. Those 
Hungarians who settled down in the region re-annexed to Hungary after 
the 1938 were forced to leave the country in May; the same methods were 
tried out at settlements with autochton population too, however, without 
success thanks to the resistance of the Hungarian government and the 
border-defence authorities. Together with the civil servants, teachers, etc. 
coming from the mother country thousands of repatriated working people 
of Upland origin became the first displaced persons as a result of the deci-
sions made by the Czechoslovakian authorities.12
Preparations were started to deport the Hungarian nationals to 
community labour to Czech land on the basis of the presidential edicts Nos. 
1 and 88. 1945. This was a means started in November 1945; first men of 
working age were deported to the Sudeten area in need of work force.13 The 
authorities instigating and executing these actions had threefold aims: to 
force the Hungarian government to sign the population-exchange treaty; 
to settle Slovaks from northern Slovakia to the southern Hungarian inhab-
ited areas; and with the inside relocation radically change the ethnic char-
acter of the area bordering Hungary. The social and ethnic considerations 
were obvious from the start out, the Slovaks from the northern moun-
tainous areas, strife with unemployment and difficult living conditions, 
had the task to change the region with compact Hungarian population into 
a Slovak one.14 They were joined by ‘repatriating’ Slovaks from Romania, 
Hungary Yugoslavia and Transcarpathia, the largest group being the 
12 János Kövesdi – Mayer Judit (szerk.): Edvard Beneš elnöki dekrétumai avagy a magyarok és 
németek jogfosztása, Pannónia Kiadó, Pozsony, 1996. pp. 131-136 Fthe presidential edicts of 
E.B., or the deprivation of civil rights of Hungarians and Germans]; Kaplan, Karel: Csehszlová-
kia igazi arca, pp. 110-11; Vadkerty Katalin: Németek és magyarok Pozsonyban 1945–1948. 
között [Germans and Hungarian in Pozsony 1945-1948]. In: Czoch Gábor – Kocsis Aranka 
– Tóth árpád (szerk.): Fejezetek Pozsony történetébõl magyar és szlovák szemmel [Chapters 
from the history of Pozsony from Hungarian and Slovak point of view], Kalligram, Pozsony, 
2005. 43–486; G. Vass István: A menekültügy kezelése Magyarországon 1945–1946-ban [The 
treatment of the refugee question in Hungary]. In: Molnár Imre – Szarka László: otthontalan 
emlékezet. Emlékkönyv a csehszlovák – magyar lakosságcsere 60. évfordulójára [Memory with-
out home – on the 60 anniversary of the Czechoslovakian – Hungarian population exchange]. 
MTA Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Kecskés László Társaság, Kompress, Komárom, 200.
13 For the obvious nationalistic aims of the settlements in Czech land with the purpose of provid-
ing man-power for reconstruction cf. Šutaj, Štefan: Nútené presídlenie Maďarov do Èiech, Uni-
versum, Prešov, 2005. pp. 20-24; For the consequences of the deportations cf.  Helena Nosková: 
A magyarok és Csehország. A tolerancia eltûnése az autoritatív csehszlovák rendszerbõl [Hub-
garians and the Czech land. The disappearance of tolerance from the authoritative Czechoslo-
vakian system].  Prágai Tükör, 2005. 3–4–5. http://www.pragaitukor.com/archive/index.php;
14 As a result of inland migration 5011 Slovakian families, i.e. 23 02 persons,  settled down in 
260 localities of Hungarian,  13 of Slovak and 8 of German majority population. In addition 
1224 Slovaks, already inhabiting the places, were given land, house or other real estates.
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Slovaks coming from Hungary under the Czechoslovakian – Hungarian 
population-exchange agreement.   
Deportation to Czech-land and population exchange
After not having received the complete support of the allied powers 
for the solution of the Hungarian question, i.e. one-sided deportation 
similar to the action against their German minority, the Czechoslo-
vakian government was faced with the renewed question whether to 
prefer inside means (forced relocation, reslovakization) or one-sided 
deportation (“transfer”, “odsun”) and population exchange in order to 
‘globally’ solve the problem. Karel Kaplan was the first to reveal the fact 
that in September 1945 Voroshilov, the president of the Allied Control 
Comission in Hungary, had encouraged Czechoslovakian foreign secre-
tary Clementis to deal with the Hungarian question internally. In his 
notes Clementis claims that Voroshilov had been of the opinion that 
since 3 million Sudeten Germans had already been ‘shoved across the 
borders’ it would be easy to relocate 300 000 Hungarians.15 The depor-
tation of Hungarians from Slovakia was carried out on the strength of 
presidential edict No. 81 and according to the plans worked out by Slova-
kian and Czech authorities. Between 25. october and 4. December 1945 
924 persons, during the second phase between 19. November 1945 and 
22. February 1946 6510 Hungarian families, i.e. 41 666 persons were 
deported.16 The difference between the two phases of deportation was not 
only in the number of the persons concerned but in character and means 
too. In 1945 mainly single working age Hungarian men were taken to 
work in Czech-land, the second phase on the other hand was carried 
out as a systematic deportation with military and police forces in the 
villages marked down for evacuation and deportation to Czech-land. In 
the meantime the Czechoslovakian and Slovakian authorities were in the 
hope that by these actions they could force the Hungarian government to 
negotiate over the population-exchange treaty and to agree in carrying 
it out in 194. In consequence those persons were deported to Czech-
land who were meant to participate in the population-exchange and also 
those who were ‘reslovakized’ as a means to increase the pressure on the 
15 Cited by Kaplan from the account of Clementis at the 11. September 1945 meeting of the 
Czechoslovakian government. Kaplan: Csehszlovákia igazi arca, p.135.
16 Šutaj, Štefan: Nútené práce, pp. 28, 66-6.
László szarka
significance of czechoslovakian–hungarian Population exchange in the history 5
Hungarian government which had indeed to succumb to the open extor-
tions of the Czechoslovakian government.1
The deportations were concentrated in the villages in the districts of 
Komárom, Dunaszerdahely, ógyalla, Somorja and Galánta including the 
Hungarian population of 220 villages who were relocated to the districts 
of Kolín, žatec, Mladá Boleslav, Pilsen and Kladno. They left behind 6602 
houses and 3884 hectares of arable land. The thus emptied houses were 
given into the charge of 266, the land to 103 Slovak and Czech national 
custodians. The valuables of the deported were finally confiscated later, 
on the strength of the 19. March 1948 governmental decree in May-June 
1948. In answer to the notes of protest of the Hungarian government the 
Czechoslovakian government made it clear that they would stop the forced 
labour programme if only Hungary acted willingly in the immediate reali-
zation of the population exchange.18
The cruel and inhumane deportation into Czech-land has left deep 
impressions in the consciousness of Hungarians in Slovakia. The villages 
surrounded by police and armed forces, the people locked in ice-cold railway 
wagons, the terrible scenes at the Czech railway stations resembled to the 
worst period of Hungarian history during the Turkish occupation, as has 
been described in contemporary memoirs. József Mindszenty, cardinal of 
Esztergom as well as the leaders of the Slovakian Catholic church, the 
bishops and the episcopate severely condemned the ruthlessness of forced 
labour. Bishop Jantausch sent a memorandum to the presidium of the 
Slovakian National Committee, to president Beneš and foreign minister 
Jan Masaryk in the name of all the bishops of Slovakia, in which he pointed 
out that when the Jews had been taken from their homes they dissociated 
from those actions conflicting with humanity and Christian love; they did 
it repeatedly as the methods of the actual actions were very similar to the 
ones objected to earlier.19
In September – october 1945 the Czechoslovak and Slovak authori-
ties started the deportation of working age Hungarians to Czech-land an 
Moravia with the openly declared intention of forcing Hungary to the 
treaty about the relocation of Hungarians from Slovakia to Hungary. 
In December 1945 Hungarian foreign minister János Gyöngyösi, who 
1 Vadkerty, Katalin: A deportálások. A szlovákiai magyarok csehországi kényszermunkája 
1945–1948. között [Deportations. The forced labour of Hungarians in Slovakia 1945-1948]. 
Kalligram Kiadó, Pozsony 1996. 28-29. Vadkerty: Maďarská otázka, pp. 89–9; Kaplan, Karel: 
Csehszlováki igazi arca, pp. 138–140.  
18 Štefan Šutaj: Maďarská menšina na Slovensku v rokoch 1945–1948 (Východiská a prax politiky 
k maďarskej menšine na Slovensku), Veda, Bratislava, 1993. 63–66.
19 Ibid. pp.105-106.
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opposed any kind of acceptance of collective guilt in the case of the 
Germans and Hungarians – with the Hungarians in Slovakia in mind, 
– remarked at the negotiations between Czechoslovakia and Hungary 
in Prague that the Hungarian government could and would take in the 
Hungarians not acceptable in Czechoslovakia only together with their 
region.20 
The issue of the Hungarians hauled away to forced labour by police 
– army force induced strong resistance, organized counter-actions, inter-
national protestations among the groups of Hungarians relocated from the 
Upland into Hungary and left-wing Hungarian intellectuals in Pozsony. 
The events promted young Hungarian clergymen and students to found 
a movement named Hungarian Democratic Popular Association (Népi 
Szövetség) in Czechoslovakia with the task of documenting minority 
grievances and inform the deprived themselves and the authorities in 
Hungary.
Kaplan’s assessment is correct that the deportation was a cruel but 
unsuccessful attempt at wiping out the Hungarian minority. It resulted 
not only in Hungarians fleeing to Hungary but seriously harming the 
Czechoslovakian – Hungarian relations.21 It can be added that in the 
memories of the Hungarian minority the experiences and narratives of 
the deportations has meant the greatest trauma; also have been the most 
difficult conflicts to absorb and amend in the political aftermath of the 
whole situation.
Enforced population exchange as the means of deportation
The population exchange treaty was signed by foreign minister János 
Gyöngyösi and Vladimír Clementis in Budapest on the 2. February 
1946. It was enforced by various diplomatic, foreign political, discrimina-
tive minority political means and from the start the parties interpreted it 
differently. While the treaty represented “the most reasonable solution of 
the Hungarian question”, the “punishment of the Hungarian minority in 
20 He declared that the proposition represented by him naturally contained a revision of the 
borders. It goes without question. However, no other solution seemed conceivable than the 
population exchange, which would satisfy the requirements of the times and democracy. Cited 
from confidential Czechoslovakian governmental material by Kaplan: Csehszlovákia igazi arca. 
p.120. Cf. also Tóth, ágnes: Telepítések Magyarországon 1945–1948. között. A németek kitel-
epítése, a belsõ népmozgások és a szlovák–magyar lakosságcsere összefüggései. Bács-Kiskun 
Megyei Önkormányzat Levéltára, Kecskemét, 1993. p.43 [Settlements in Hungary 1945-1948. 
Relationship between he deportation of Germans, inland relocation and the Slovak – Hungar-
ian population exchange].
21 Kaplan: Csehszlovákia igazi arca. P. 138.
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keeping with international resolutions” a “prudent settlement” for Prague 
and Pozsony, for the Hungarians it remained an unequal agreement 
enforced upon Hungary by the deportations to Czech-land. By signing the 
treaty, however, Hungary succeeded in slowing down the confiscation of 
the valuables of the Hungarian minority members, their deprivation of 
rights and the scattering of the Hungarian communities in the country. 
For those Hungarians who had already been designated for exchange the 
Hungarian government assured the preservation of their movable posses-
sions as well as their ordered settlement in Hungary. 
Since the Potsdam conference had not allowed the one-sided transfer 
as the solution of the Hungarian question, leading Czechoslovakian poli-
ticians regarded the Czechoslovakian – Hungarian population exchange 
as the most important means of deportation from autumn 1945; also, 
they were in the hope of persuading 300 000–400 000 Slovakians living in 
Hungary to participate in the exchange. 
The Czechoslovakian authorities had compiled a list of about 450 000 
Slovak nationals or persons of Slovak descent allegedly based on historical 
studies in 1946.22 The Czechoslovakian special committee, which agitated 
among the Slovaks in Hungary, had to understand that the figures were 
unreasonable. Between 4. March and 2. May 1946 as the result of the 
recruiting allowed in the population exchange treaty, there were 90 
090 persons who signed up for resettlement in Slovakia. Later this was 
increased by further 520 Slovak applicants.23 
The signing of the Czechoslovakian – Hungarian population exchange 
treaty on the 2. February 1946 was enforced by the deportation to Czech-
land and the continued confiscation, depravation of rights of Hungarians; 
it was indeed an unfavourable agreement for Hungary. The Czechoslova-
kian government had seized the right to recruit re-settlers in Hungarian 
territory; they also were given free hand in choosing the Hungarians to 
move to Hungary as set in the population exchange treaty. By mid-August 
1948, the Czechoslovakian authorities completed the list of Hungarians in 
Slovakia to be deported. The list contained 181 000 names of which 105 
22 The 1941 census registered 20 000 persons speaking Slovakian in the post-Trianon territory 
of Hungary, of whom 6 000 claimed to have Hungarian as their mother tongue and only 1 
000 to be Slovak nationals. The Czechoslovakian transfer committee on the other hand reck-
oned with 450 – 45 000 Slovaks by special historical – demographic and religious statistical 
counts. Cf. Kugler, József: Lakosságcsere a Délkelet-Alföldön 1944-1948, osiris – MTA Kisebb-
ségkutató Mûhely, Budapest, 2000. 28-34 [Population exchange on the south-eastern part of 
the Great Hungarian Plain].
23 The representatives of the Czechoslovakian transfer committee handed over the Hungarian 
government the list of applicant from Hungary on the 2 June 1946. Bobák, Ján: Maďarská 
otázka, id. m. 84–86.
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04 answered the requirements of the category defined by Article V. of the 
treaty, the rest the so-called criminals of war according to Article VI.24 The 
treaty, however, enabled the Hungarian government to become an equal 
and determining party in the organization, control and transaction of the 
exchange.25 
In the 14 months prior to the signing of the population exchange treaty 
and the first transports, the Czechoslovakian authorities regarded the 
deportation to Czech-land, the scattering of Hungarians in the territory 
as the best inner solutions of the Hungarian question. Since the processes 
met severe objections from the Hungarian government and public, even 
from international public, the Czechoslovakian and Slovakian authorities 
decided upon forcible assimilation.
Reslovakization as the means of forcible assimilation
The Slovakian office representing internal affairs regarded the so-called 
reslovakization and the re-settling of Slovakian nationals into the prop-
erties left behind by Hungarian nationals the best internal means of the 
final solution of the Hungarian question.26 There followed a process during 
which applications for reslovakization were handed in in the name of more 
than 400 000 persons.2
originally reslovakization was planned on a smaller scale by Slov-
enská Liga and the representatives of the Slovakian regional government 
and meant to gain the persons with double, uncertain and alternating 
national identity. Between 1. June and 1. July 1946, during the fortnight 
for handing in applications; there were 108 38 families, 352 038 persons 
24 Ibid. pp.8-88. According to the Hungarian records the Czechoslovakian list handed over in 
Pozsony the 26. Augustus 1946 contained the data of 106 398 persons as described in Arti-
cle V. Popély árpád:  A (cseh)szlovákiai magyarság történeti kronológiája 1944–1992. Fórum 
Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Somorja, 2006. 105. [Historical chronology of Hungarians in Czecho-
slovakia].
25 Cf. Bobák Ján: Maďarská otázka v Èesko-Slovensku 1944–1948, Matica slovenská, Martin, 
1996; Kugler József: lakosságcsere a Délkelet-Alföldön, id. m; Szarka László (szerk.): A szlová-
kiai magyarok kényszerkitelepítésének emlékezete 1945-1948, MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebb-
ségkutató Intézet -- Kecskés László Társaság, Komárom, 2003; Uõ.: Jogfosztó jogszabályok,; 
Vadkerty Katalin: A belsõ telepítések és a lakosságcsere,;  Vadkerty: A kitelepítéstõl a reszlo-
vakizációig. Trilógia a csehszlovákiai magyarság 1945–1948. közötti történetérõl, Kalligram 
Könyvkiadó, Pozsony, 2001 [From deportation to reslovakization]; Vadkerty: Maďarská otázka 
v Èeskoslovensku. 
26 A Šutaj, Štefan.: Reslovakizácia. Zmena národnosti èasti obyvateľstva Slovenska po II. svetovej 
vojne. Košice, 1991. pp. 23-28.
2 Vadkerty, Katalin: A reszlovakizáció. Kalligram Kiadó Pozsony 1993. pp.31-36.
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applying. In 1948, by the end of the process 282 594 persons were granted 
Slovakian nationality out of 410 820 applicants.28 
The written accounts of the history of the 1946-4 reslovakization 
indicates that in the personal and collective memory of Hungarians 
in Slovakia reslovakization has been a kind of community taboo due to 
complex mass phychological processes. At the time fear was the most char-
acteristic feeling of the entire Hungarian community: fear of the total loss 
of civil rights, of being scattered geographically, of the loss of home, land, 
possessions, etc. 
The reslovakization process introduced in June 1946 promised redemp-
tion for abandoning Hungarian nationality and applying for the Slovak one; 
reslovakized people got back their Czechoslovakian citizenship together 
with their civil rights, could keep their houses land and possessions and, 
at least according to the early promises, were not threatened any longer by 
deportation to Czech-land or to Hungary. Reslovakization originally was 
for those persons who claimed to be Slovaks, however. Between 1946 and 
1948 it became the means of the most ruthless pressure against Hungary 
and the Hungarians living in Slovakia. Hungarians in Slovakia wanted 
to keep their rights, homes, possessions, the land of their birth; the polit-
ical power aiming at the ethnic reorganization of the southern Slovakian 
region blackmailed them through one of their basic rights, that of their 
declaration of national identity. 
As during the August – September 1946 peace negotiations in Paris the 
Czechoslovakian delegation had proved unsuccessful in making accepted 
the unilateral deportation of those Hungarians, who were not reslovak-
ized neither belonged to the categories of the population exchange, the 
Czechoslovakian politicians started decisive preparations for the so-called 
“global solution” of the Hungarian question. They planned to relocate all 
the reslovakized persons and the Hungarians remaining in Slovakia to 
Czech-land to be forcefully assimilated.
All the steps of the Czechoslovakian and Slovakian authorities against 
minorities of the period had the resolute aim of the total liquidation of 
the Hungarian minority communities; therefore the research and analysis 
of the processes should also be made in context. The procedures, actions 
and plans towards the cleansing of southern Slovakia of minorities were 
closely connected to one another; the Slovakian settlement office, corpora-
tion of representative and the Interior as well as the Foreign Ministry in 
Prague decided upon the measures to be taken with a keen eye being kept 
at the reactions in Hungary.
28 Popély árpád:  A (cseh)szlovákiai magyarság történeti kronológiája. p. 99.
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Forced re-settlements and their consequences  
The forced re-settlement of the Hungarians within Czechoslovakia and to 
Hungary had grievous consequences. The losses through migration and 
assimilation became apparent through the data of the 1950 census.29 In 
addition to the – temporary – population decrease the Hungarian commu-
nities suffered serious material losses too. Those returning from Czech 
labour could not always move back to their old homes; the confiscated 
land properties given to foreign settlers, the unsolved circumstances of the 
population exchange, etc. caused heavy material damage.30  
The basic principle of economic parity stipulated in the Czechoslo-
vakian – Hungarian population exchange was constantly breached, the 
range and number of the so-called Hungarian war criminals in Czecho-
slovakia was unjustifiably increased and added as surplus to the agreed 
exchange quota; the Hungary had no other means of legal protection than 
to procrastinate the execution of the population exchange till April 194. 
However, the hand of the Hungarian government was forced by the mass 
deportations to Czech-land by armed-force assistance. 
The ethnic composition of the towns and villages in southern Slovakia 
was fundamentally changed by the inland re-settling of 590 Slovakian 
families and the 9200 households coming from Hungary, altogether 65 000 
Slovak nationals who took the place of 110 – 130 000 Hungarians deported 
to Czech-land or fleeing to Hungary.31 
There was also the plan to turn the southern Slovakian region mono-
lingual by re-educating the 300 000 odd reslovakized persons linguistically 
and thus nationally. It was accompanied by the re-naming of the settle-
ments, giving Slovak form of the family names, prohibition of earlier bili-
gualism, the expelling the use of the Hungarian language in school and 
church, paralysing every form of Hungarian communal life and punishing 
all public use of  the Hungarian language and culture.32 
29 The number of Hungarian population in Czechoslovakia decreased from 592 000 in 1930 to 355 
000, the their proportion in Slovakia from 1,8% to 10,3%. Popély árpád:  A (cseh)szlovákiai 
magyarság történeti kronológiája. p. 1.
30 The possession left behind by Hungarians relocated to Hungary had a value of 2 million dol-
lars more than that of the Slovakians relocated to Czechoslovakia. Szabó, Károly: A csehszlovák 
magyar lakosságcsere gazdasági vonatkozásai, [The eoconomic aspects of the Czechoslovakian 
– Hungarian population exchange]  In: Szarka László (ed.) otthontalan emlékezet, pp. 92–100. 
Cf. Vadkerty Katalin:  A belsõ telepítések és a lakosságcsere, pp. 166–169.  
31 Ibid. 
32  Szarka, László: Jogfosztó jogszabályok, pp. 230–251.
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Protests and organizations against the deprivation of civil 
rights by Hungarians in Czechoslovakia
The existence of the Hungarian minority community, which was self-
confident and well organized in the first twenty years of its existence, was 
present only in separated actions against the deprivation of rights. The 
Hungarians in Slovakia, even those who declared resistance, expected the 
protection of their minority rights from Hungary. Though Hungary had 
lost the war its government tried to use every possible means of protest 
to protect Hungarians since the first appearance of Czechoslovakian 
breach of law. By sending repeatedly memoranda it drew the attention 
of the representatives of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, the 
western members of the allied powers as well as the Soviet government to 
the atrocities against the Hungarians in Czechoslovakia.33 
1946 was the year of hope and great ordeals for the Hungarians in 
Czechoslovakia. During the Hungarian preparations to the peace negotia-
tions there were promises of fairer and more lasting solutions, that the 
great powers would correct the mistakes committed when delineating the 
state borders and would consider the ethnic borders between Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia. The year started with Czechoslovakian – Hungarian 
population exchange treaty signed in Prague on the 2. February causing 
great disappointment and even greater fear.34  
objections against the population exchange treaty were most concisely 
summed up in a 1946 memorandum of unknown origin addressed to 
Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi, which expressed fears about the esca-
lation of steps aiming at the liquidation of the minority; therefore regarded 
the treaty a mistake: after the signing of the Czechoslovakian – Hungarian 
treaty it was noticed that not only were there no improvements in the 
33 Földesi, Margit: Kitelepítés, lakosságcsere és a Szövetséges Ellenõrzõ Bizottság, In: Szarka, 
László (ed.): otthontalan emlékezet, pp. 12–132 [Deportation, population exchange and the 
Allied Control Commission]
34 The Hungarians, who were attached to their birth country, had to understand that the govern-
ment of Ferenc Nagy was forced to agree about the exchange of those Hungarians in Slovakia 
who had already been assigned for re-location and the free applicant Slovakians in Hungary. 
Nevertheless, the Népi Szövetség [popular association] sent a letter to Minister President 
Zoltán Tildy on the 24. January 1946 and a month later to Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi 
to express their reservations about the preparations and the logic of  the population exchange 
treaty. Tóth László  (szerk.):  „Hívebb emlékezésül…” Csehszlovákiai magyar emlékiratok és 
egyéb dokumentumok a jogfosztottság éveibõl 1945–1948, Kalligram Kiadó, Pozsony, 1995. 
112–115 [For better remembrance. Hungarian memoirs and other documents from the years 
of deprivation of rights in Czechoslovakia]. The treaty was criticized within the Hungarian 
foreign ministry too. Cf. the memorandum by János Vájlok, the referent of the ministry, by 
birth a Hungarian from Slovakia. Ibid. pp.116-118.
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national, economic and personal existence of the Hungarians in Czechoslo-
vakia, their entire human life faced new ordeals.35 
It is known that it was the veto of the US peace delegation that 
checked the plans of total liquidation of Hungarians in Slovakia; the 
Czechoslovakian – Hungarian borders, however, have not been changed. 
Neither the compensatory regional modification urged by the Hungarian 
delegation, nor the plans of the Népi Szövetség for a referendum to newly 
defined border was considered by the great powers directing the decisions 
of the peace conference. The rejection of the Czechoslovakian demands 
for mono-lateral transfer and the determined repetition of the claim for 
“people together with land” resulted finally in the decision that the peace 
conference delegated the solution of the problem to the treaty between the 
two states; in the given situation that was possibly the only success of the 
Hungarian diplomacy.
The balance of the population exchange
In spite of the speed of the necessary preparations of the transactions, 
the population exchange could not start earlier than April 194, with the 
exchange of the Slovaks from the southern part of the Great Hungarian 
plain and the Hungarians from Mátyusföld in Slovakia. When carrying out 
the directives of the treaty so unadvantageous for Hungary, the Hungarian 
party was keen on observing personal and property parity from the outset 
thus trying to prevent the Czechoslovakian intentions to use the popu-
lation exchange to liquidate the Hungarian communities in Slovakia. In 
spite of the constant complaints on the Hungarian side again disparity, 
it proved to be impossible to adhere to the parity of property: the 6 616 
Hungarians from Slovakia had to leave behind over 8000 hectare arable 
land and 15 00 houses, while there remained 500 hectare arable land 
and 4400 houses from the Slovaks in Hungary.36
The population exchange was completed from April 194 to the 
summer of 1949; after 22. December 1948 only those were relocated who 
were in existential danger, applied for family re-unification or volunteered 
to participate in the procedures. The protocol of Csorbató of 25. July 1949 
provided for the material differences resulted due to the exchange. The 
two parties considered their respective claims – the Hungarian claims for 
the losses of the exchange, the Czechoslovakian ones:  damage caused by 
the republic of councils, damage during World War II, the 30 million dollar 
35 Ibid. p. 119.
36 Vadkerty, Katalin:  A belsõ telepítések és a lakosságcsere, pp. 166–169, 194-19..
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reparations to Hungary according the decisions of the Paris conference as 
well as the collective value of the Czechoslovakian property nationalized 
in Hungary).3
The two negative aspects: the population exchange treaty and the 
massive reslovakization could, however, be one of the reasons of the 
survival of the Hungarian community in Slovakia between 1945 and 1949, 
reinforced by various other aspects e.g. the support of the western democ-
racies, that the western allies had refused the Czechoslovakian claims at 
the Paris conference aiming at the liquidation of the Hungarian minority 
in Czechoslovakia. on the surface, the signing of the population exchange 
treaty by the Hungarian government opened free way to the deporta-
tions. However, it was successful in using the possibilities of diplomacy 
in opposition to the Prague government as well as the soviet government 
that supported the complete liquidation of the Hungarian communities in 
Slovakia during the Paris conference; it could also maximally use diplo-
matic means to assure the population exchange – keeping within the 
minimal limits of the exchange quota – to be carried out under orderly 
economic conditions. The bilateral population exchange treaty ensured 
that Hungary was able to prevent the realization of the mono-lateral 
deportation and the Paris treaty obliged the two states to bilateral agree-
ment concerning the future of the Hungarians remaining in their birth 
place in Slovakia.
3 For the text of the protocol see Balogh, Sándor – Földesi – Margit (eds.): A Magyar jóvátétel és 
ami mögötte van… Válogatott dokumentumok 1945 –1948. Napvilág Napvilág Kiadó, Budapest 
1998 [The Hungarian reparations and their background].
